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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
INTERNATIONAL HuMAN RIGHTS-HELsNuI ACCORDS-
CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
ADOPTS COPENHAGEN DOCUMENT ON HUMAN RIGHTS
.I. FACTS
On June 28, 1990, the thirty-five representatives of the participating
States' ("States") of the Conference on Cooperation and Security in
Europe2 (CSCE) unanimously adopted the forty-five point Copen-
hagen Document on Human Rights3 (the "Copenhagen Document"
or CDHR). This document was the culmination of a three-and-one-
half week meeting4 between the delegates from every European coun-
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, France,
the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, the
Holy Sea, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Lichtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Mon-
aco, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, San Marino, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United
Kingdom, the United States of America, and Yugoslavia. Document of the Copen-
hagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe at 1, [hereinafter Copenhagen Document] re-
printed in 29 I.L.M. 1305 (Sept. 1990) (in press; copies are available in the interim
from Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, United States Congress,
Washington, D.C. 20515). These signatories are all participating States in the CSCE,
see infra note 2.
2 The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe began with the Helsinki
Accords in 1973; the Final Act of the Helsinki Accords ("Final Act") was signed
August 1, 1975, 14 I.L.M. 1292; reprinted in 73 STATE DEP'T BULL. 323 (Sept. 1975)
[hereinafter Final Act]. The CSCE has continued with a series of bilateral meetings
to maintain an on-going forum among Member States towards attaining the goals
of the CSCE.
The Copenhagen Document is the product of the second of three meetings by
the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE. The Conference on the
Human Dimension was established by the Concluding Document of the Vienna
Meeting 1986 of Representatives of the Participating States of the Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe, Held on the Basis of the Provisions of the
Final Act Relating to the Followup to the Conference, 28 I.L.M. 527, reprinted in
89 STATE DEP'T BULL. 21, 34 (Mar. 1989) [hereinafter Vienna Concluding Document].
4 The first meeting of the Human Dimension of the CSCE was held in Paris in
1989, the Copenhagen meeting was the second meeting of the Conference, and the
third meeting is scheduled for Moscow in 1991, prior to the next main CSCE Follow-
up Meeting in Helsinki in March of 1992. Id.
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try, except Albania', and the United States and Canada. The Copen-
hagen meeting was part of the CSCE system established to monitor
and follow up the human rights advancements of the 1975 Helsinki
Accords. 6 The Document has been hailed as a "milestone" in the field
of human rights and fundamental freedoms, 7 and as a historic achieve-
ment which parallels the recent political developments in Eastern Eu-
rope.8
The Document welcomes the fundamental political changes in Eu-
rope which have occurred since the first Meeting of the Conference
on the Human Dimension in the early summer of 1989, 9 and recognizes
that the rule of law and pluralistic democracy are essential to the
respect of human rights.' 0 Furthermore, the States express a com-
mitment to the ideals of democracy and to their common determi-
nation to build democratic societies based on free elections," and a
Albania is not a co-signatory of the 1975 Helsinki Final Act on human rights,
but was unanimously granted observer status to the human rights conference on
June 5, 1990. Albania Comes in from Cold to Join Family, Daily Telegraph, June
6, 1990, at 10 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Telegr file). Thus, the decision of Marxist
Albania to break its post-war isolation brought all the European countries together
for the first time since the Second World War. Id. The Soviet Baltic states of Latvia,
Estonia, and Lithuania were denied observer status, which requires unanimous ap-
proval by all 35 Member States of the CSCE. Baltic States Ask for CSCE Observer
Status, Reuter Lib. Rep., July 19, 1990 (BC Cycle) (LEXIS, Nexis library, Lbyrpt
file).
6 See supra notes 2-3.
7 Helmut Tuerk, leader of the Austrian delegation, at the last plenary meeting
of the conference. Copenhagen Pact Hailed as Rights Landmark, The Times (London),
June 29, 1990, Overseas News Section, at 7, col 2 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Times
file).
' Id.; see also news conference statement of Danish Foreign Minister Uffe
Elleman-Jensen, Human Rights Meeting Agrees Landmark Declaration, Reuter Lib.
Rep., June 29, 1990 (BC Cycle) (LEXIS, Nexis library, Lbyrpt file).
9 Copenhagen Document, supra note 1, at 1. The necessary consensus on a final
document by all CSCE states was not reached at the first meeting of the Conference
in Paris. Copenhagen Pact Hailed as Rights Landmark, supra note 7.
1o The earlier failure of this recognition was attributed to the difficulty in agree-
ment on the main rule-of-law proposal among the States in the face of East-West
confrontation. Id. The lack of objections from the East European countries at
Copenhagen this year led the Canadian delegate to declare that there are no longer
two Europes, as "a common democratic space is being created from Vancouver to
Vladivostock." CSCE Nations Pledged to Uphold Rule of Law, Fin. Times, June
29, 1990, § 1 (European News), at 2, col. 2 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Fintme file).
1 "The participating States... welcome the commitment expressed by all par-
ticipating States to the ideals of democracy and political pluralism as well as their
common determination to build democratic societies based on free elections and the
rule of law." Copenhagen Document, supra note 1, at 1.
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subsequent conviction that these societies, in accordance with the full
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, are a prerequisite
to the establishment of lasting peace, security, justice, and co-op-
eration in Europe. 12
The Document is divided into five sections, the first of which
declares the protection and promotion of human rights as one of the
basic purposes of government. 3 This section also supports the rule
of law as "justice based on the recognition and full acceptance of
the supreme value of the human personality' 1 4 and not as a mere
legal formality." Additionally, this section confirms the States' rights
to freely choose and develop political, social, economic, and cultural
systems in accordance with the standards of international human
rights, 6 and declares that free elections 7 and representative govern-
ment ,'8 inter alia, are essential to inalienable human rights.' 9 The
States reaffirm their continuing consideration of acceding to the
European Convention on Human Rights, 20 and other relevant inter-
national instruments on human rights.2 ' This section was considered
the most significant by the delegates. a
The second section concerns individual human rights and reaffirms
the right to freedom of expression. 2 Furthermore, it evidences the
States' commitment to ensure individual rights, to know and act upon
human rights,2' and to discuss and develop better means to ensure
compliance with international human rights standards.2- Some rem-
edies for alleged human rights violations are enumerated,2 and the
32 Id. at 2.
13 Id. at para. (1).
1" Id. at para. (2).
is 1d.
1 Id. at para. (4).
'7 Id. at para. (5.1).
,1 Id. at para. (5.2).
19 Id. at para. (5).
Id. at para. (5.21).
I, d. at para. (5.20). These other international instruments include the "Inter-
national Bill of Human Rights", see infra notes 51-52.
2 Human Rights Meeting Agrees Landmark Declaration, Reuter Lib. Rep., June
29, 1990 (BC Cycle) (LEXIS, Nexis library, Lbyrpt file).
" Copenhagen Document, supra note 1, at para. (9.1). These rights include
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. Id. at para. (9.4).
14 Id. at para. (10).
1 Id. at para. (10.2).
Id. at para. (11). Paragraph (11), which for the first time in the Helsinki
process spells out specific remedies for human rights violations states:
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prohibition of torture is reaffirmed. 27 However, this section contains
a "back door" clause which states that the exercise of human rights
may be subject to restrictions provided by law, and such restrictions,
if consistent with the States' obligations under international law, shall
"have the character of exceptions." 28 The impetus of the third section
is the promotion of national institutions for human rights, and the
rule of law, 29 and recognition of the necessity of democratic values,
practices, and institutions."
The fourth, and most controversial", section concerns the rights
of minorities, which the participating States assert can only be resolved
satisfactorily in a democratic framework based on the rule of law.32
States are requested to adopt special measures to ensure full equality
of minorities before the law33 and members of national minorities
are given the right to freely express their national identity and culture
without forced assimilation.3 However, compromise among the States
was necessary to reach a consensus regarding the Copenhagen Doc-
ument.3 Although rights for national minorities are recognized in the
(11) The participating States further affirm that, where violations of human rights
and fundamental freedoms are alleged to have occurred, the effective remedies
available include
(11.1) - the right of the individual to seek and receive adequate legal assistance;
(11.2) - the right of the individual to seek and receive assistance from others in
defending human rights and fundamental freedoms, and to assist others in defending
human rights and fundamental freedoms;
(11.3) - the right of individuals or groups acting on their behalf to communicate
with international bodies with competence to receive and consider information con-
cerning allegations of human rights abuses.
Id. at para. (16.1).
n Id. at para. (24).
Id. at para. (27).
Id. at para. (26).
11 Human Rights Meeting Agrees Landmark Declaration, Reuter Lib. Rep., June
28, 1990 (BC Cycle) (LEXIS, Nexis library, Lbyrpt file). The national minorities
aspect of the Document was the most contentious, primarily due to latent ethnic
conflicts which have surfaced since the recent end of one-party Communist rule in
central and southern Europe. Landmark Declaration Adopted on Rights in East
Europe, Reuter Lib. Rep., June 29, 1990 (BC Cycle) (LEXIS, Nexis library, Lbyrpt
file).
12 Copenhagen Document, supra note 1, at para. (30).
11 Id. at para. (31).
.4 Id. at para. (32).
" See Copenhagen Pact Hailed as Rights Landmark, supra note 7, at 7, col. 2.
Compromise is usually necessary to obtain a consensus among diverse states in
support of the terms of a given international document. Such compromise is ac-
ceptable because the unanimous consensus it gains towards the international agree-
ment lends more of a binding effect to the agreement under international customary
law.
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document, the need for compromise led to the limitation of the
exercise of minority rights as being subject to a state's policies and
laws. 36
The final section reaffirms the human dimension37 of the CSCE
as an integral part of the approach to security and co-operation in
Europe, 38 further enhances the procedures of the Vienna Concluding
Document, 39 and tables proposals to strengthen the human dimension
mechanism for further development at subsequent relevant CSCE
fora.4o
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
International legal protection of human rights is a dynamic de-
velopment of the last forty-five years. 4' Origins of the concept that
international law could protect individual human rights have been
attributed to the Nuremburg Trials at the end of the Second World
War. 42 The adoption of the United Nations Charter quickly followed,
which declares in its Preamble the aim "to reaffirm faith in fun-
damental human rights," and states as one of its purposes "[t]o
achieve international cooperation ... in promoting and encouraging
36Human Rights Meeting Agrees Landmark Declaration, Reuter Lib. Rep., June
29, 1990 (BC Cycle) (LEXIS, Nexis library, Lbyrpt file). Objections by France,
Greece, and Bulgaria caused hasty re-drafting of the section on minorities. Id. Greece
and Bulgaria both appended "interpretive statements" on the national minorities
issue to the final document. CSCE Nations Pledged to Uphold Rule of Law, Fin.
Times, June 29, 1990, § 1 (European News), at 2, col. 2.
11 The "human dimension" of the CSCE refers to "the undertakings entered into
in the Final Act and in other CSCE documents concerning respect for all human
rights and fundamental freedoms, human contacts and other issues of a related
humanitarian character." Vienna Concluding Document, supra note 3, at 34.
11 Copenhagen Document, supra note 1, at para. (41).
19 Id. at para. (42). See infra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
- Copenhagen Document, supra note 1, at para. (43).
41 Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals
Rather Than States, 32 AM. U.L. REv. I at 1 (1982). See generally L.B. SOHN AND
T. BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HumAN Ric;Hrs (1973) for a more
specific analysis of this development.
42 Komarow, Individual Responsibility Under International Law: The Nuremburg
Principles in Domestic Legal Systems, 29 INT'L & ComP. L.Q. 24 (1980); Whitfield,
How the Working Organs of the European Convention Have Elevated the Individual
to the Level of Subject of International Law, 12 ILSA J. INT'L L. 27, 30 (1988).
The Nuremburg Trials were international tribunals established after World War II
which held individuals subject to international rules relating to war crimes and crimes
against humanity. The trials were held in order to try Nazi war criminals for atrocities
committed in concentration camps during the war. Id. Similar trials in Tokyo held
Japanese war criminals liable for their human rights violations as well.
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respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. ' 43 Soon there-
after, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which enumerates
the basic human rights," was adopted.
These early tribunals and agreements defined human rights in terms
of general principles, and soon led to the development of international
covenants on human rights .4 Two years after the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights, the Council of Europe adopted the Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, 46 which established the European Court of Human Rights47
and implemented its procedures for adjudication." The Convention
also created the European Commission on Human Rights49 which
established a process of review whereby the Commission may receive
petitions from victims of human rights violations committed by the
High Contracting Parties.50 The UN General Assembly, continuing
the trend towards international codification of human rights, sub-
sequently approved two covenants on human rights in 1966, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights5'
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,5 2 both
41 UN CHARTER art. 1, para. 3. For a general discussion, see Cohn, International
Ajudication of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights, 7 GA. J.
INT'L & Cohe. L. 315, 316 (1977).
" G.A. Res. 217, UN Doc. A/810 (1948). The UDHR was proclaimed by the
General Assembly as a common standard of achievement by which to promote
respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. Id. Its rights include the right
to life, liberty, and security of person (art. 3), and the right to freedom of thought,
conscience, and religion (art. 18).
45 Cohn, supra note 43, at 316.
46 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
signed Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221, EUROP. T.S. No. 5 [hereinafter European
Convention on Human Rights or ECHR]; the ECHR was drafted in consideration
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See Preamble to ECHR, 213 U.N.T.S.
221, EuRop. T.S. No. 5. For a review of the ECHR, see Cohn, supra note 43, at
319-326.
47 ECHR, supra note 46, art. 19, para. 2.
" Id. at art. 19-57.
49 Id. at art. 19, para. 1.
50 Id. at art. 25, para. 4.
1, G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
52 G.A. Res. 2200, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
The International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (supra note
51) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights have been referred
to collectively as the International Bill of Rights, or alternatively as the International
Human Rights Covenants of 1966. More information on these covenants may be
found in Sohn, supra note 41, at 19-25.
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of which provide for implementation that is binding on the party
States.5 3
The Helsinki Accords 4 mark a change in the legal aspect of in-
ternational human rights law. The Conference on Security and Co-
operation in Europe began in Helsinki as a series of meetings to
reaffirm United States-Soviet spheres of influence, but developed into
a declaration on human rights as well.55 The principal human rights
provisions of the Final Act are found in the "Human Contacts"
section of Basket 11156 and in Principle VII of Basket J.17 Principle
VII further promises conformity with the Charter of the United
Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.58
The importance of the Final Act is that by requiring the partici-
pating States to attend a series of meetings designed to discuss and
update the issues and political principles contained within the Act,59
a process for continuous dialogue between the East and West was
created.60 More significantly, the provision in Principle VII "con-
firming the right of the individual to know and act upon his rights
and duties ' 61 has been siezed upon by citizens in Warsaw Pact coun-
tries to establish monitoring groups for human rights violations. Thus,
the Final Act is an important document in the development of inter-
national human rights standards as a foundation for civil rights
campaigns .62
13 Cohn, supra note 43, at 316-17.
14 See supra note 2.
5 Stanfield, Under Europe's Umbrella, 22 NAT'L J. 826 at 826 (1990).
5 The three major sections of the Final Act were informally designated as "Bas-
kets" by the delegates. Russell, Follow-up at Madrid: Another Chance for the United
States, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 359, 361, n. 8 (1980). Basket III concerns the
intent to allow freer movement of people and exchange of information and ideas.
Final Act, supra note 2.
1. Principle VII declares that "participating States will respect human rights and
fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion, or
belief, for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion." Final Act,
supra note 2.
5 Supra notes 43-44.
19 Final Act, supra note 2. For a more detailed discussion of the meetings process,
see U.S. Foreign Policy - Helsinki Final Act: United States Participation in the
Bern and Vienna Meetings, 1 HARv. Hum. RTS. Y.B. 279, 279-282 (1988) [hereinafter
U.S. Foreign Policy).
Nimetz, Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe: Retrospect and
Prospect, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 323, 326 (1980).
6 Leary, The Right of the Individual To Know and Act Upon His Rights and
Duties: Monitoring Groups and the Helsinki Final Act, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 375, 394 (1980).
62 Id.; Ratification of the Human Rights Treaties: Toward Giving Legal Effect
1990]
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The Final Act is considered by some scholars to be "politically
binding" rather than legally binding, 63 thus requiring support from
an international legal framework such as that provided by human
rights treaties. 4 Clearly the Final Act is not, and was not intended
to be, a treaty. 65 Thus, it is not at present a legally binding document.
However, the Act does manifest legal implications and effects, 6 for
as an internationally agreed upon program it has a specific legal
nature.67 With time and continued acceptance, the Final Act may
come to be regarded as customary international law, 68 in much the
same manner as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has come
to be accepted as international custom.69
Subsequent CSCE meetings varied in their contribution to inter-
national human rights law. No consensus was reached in the Belgrade
Followup Meeting 70 because of the refusal of the Soviets to discuss
new measures in the human rights field. 7' For this reason, the primary
focus at Belgrade was a line by line review of compliance with the
to the Helsinki Final Act, 5 GEO. MASON U.L. REv. 185, 186 (1982) [hereinafter
Ratification of Human Rights].
63 U.S. Foreign Policy, supra note 59, at 279; Ratification of Human Rights,
supra note 62, at 192.
Ratification of Human Rights, supra note 62, at 192.
63 Kiss and Dominick, The International Legal Significance of the Human Rights
Provisions of the Helsinki Final Act, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 293, 296-300
(1980). The Final Act contained a provision that its text was "not eligible for
registration under Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations." Final Act,
supra note 2. Article 102 determines that every treaty or international agreement
entered into by any member of the United Nations should be registered with the
Secretariat of the UN, U.N. Charter, art. 102, para. 1, thus the delegates must not
have intended for the Final Act to be treated as a treaty. Kiss & Dominick, supra
at 296-97. This political maneuver has, to this day, caused legal scholars a great
deal of consternation.
- Kiss & Dominick, supra note 65, at 300.
67 Id. at 312-13.
6 Id. at 315; see also D'Amato, Book Review, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 960 (1984).
6 Sohn, supra note 41, at 14-17. The UDHR was not regarded as a treaty
imposing legal obligations when it was first approved by the General Assembly. Id.
at 15. However, it is now accepted as binding on all states as a basic component
of international customary law. Id. at 17.
70 Text of the Concluding Document of the Belgrade Meeting 1977 of Represen-
tatives of the Participating States of the Conference on Security and Co-operation
in Europe, Held on the Basis of the Provisions of the Final Act Relating to the
Followup to the Conference, March 8, 1978, 17 I.L.M. 414 (1978), reprinted in 13
VAND. J. TMNSNAT'L L. 643, 644 (1980) (App. B) [hereinafter Belgrade Concluding
Document].
7 Fascell, The CSCE Follow-up Mechanism from Belgrade to Madrid, 13 VAND.
J. TlANSNAT'L L. 335, 344 (1980).
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Final Act. 72 In spite of the brevity of the concluding document," the
importance of the Belgrade meeting was the provision for the con-
tinuation of the Helsinki process74 and the firm establishment of
human rights as a recognized and legitimate element of East-West
diplomacy". The review of individual compliance with the Final Act
emphasized the numbers of minorities denied equality by CSCE States76
and indicated the repression of the CSCE monitoring groups.77
The second Followup Meeting in Madrid was slightly more suc-
cessful, as it reiterated numerous passages of the Final Act 7 estab-
lished the next Followup Meeting in Vienna 7 9 and slightly enhanced
the Helsinki human rights languages° in its Concluding Document.
The Madrid Concluding Document contained an extensive condem-
nation of terrorism and stressed the importance of constant progress
toward securing respect for the rights of national minorities. 8' The
Madrid Document encouraged exchange of information and freedom
of journalistic enterprise, 82 and expressed favor towards the study of
geographically confined European languages.8 3
The third Followup Meeting in Vienna led to significant advances
in international human rights, as the detailed provisions and decla-
rations regarding human rights in the Vienna Concluding Document84
72 U.S. Foreign Policy, supra note 59, at 284.
1 Fascell, supra note 71, at 347.
4 Id. The Madrid Followup Meeting was scheduled for November, 1980. Belgrade
Concluding Document, supra note 70, at 644.
" Fascell, supra note 71, at 347; U.S. Foreign Policy, supra note 59, at 284,
285.
76 Goldberg, Human Rights and the Belgrade Meeting, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 317, 319 (1980).
" Fascell, supra note 71, at 342. Also see supra notes 61-62 and accompanying
text. The use of specific names and countries in discussion of human rights violations
under the Final Act came to be identified as a United States tactic at this time,
although other signatories cited specific violations as well. Fascell, supra note 71,
at 342.
78 See Tretter, Human Rights in the Concluding Document of the Vienna Follow-
up Meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe of January
15, 1989, 10 HuM. RTS. L.J. 257, 258 (1989).
79 Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, Madrid Concluding Doc-
ument, Sept. 9, 1983, 22 I.L.M. 1398 (1983), reprinted in 83 DEP'T ST. BULL. 53
at 59 (1983) [hereinafter Madrid Concluding Document].
80 U.S. Foreign Policy, supra note 59, at 285.
11 Madrid Concluding Document, supra, note 79, at 53-54.
a2 Id. at 58. Translation and dissemination of works of literature was also en-
couraged.
11 Id. at 59.
" See Vienna Concluding Document, supra note 3.
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replaced the earlier trend of broad formulations in CSCE documents.8 1
For the first time at a Followup meeting, certain hearings were open
to the public.8 The socialist concept that human rights were exclusively
within the scope of each individual state's internal affairs was no
longer adhered to by most Eastern bloc countries, allowing an open
recognition of the international responsibility for the protection of
human rights.87 The free exercise of national minority rights was
further enhanced, as "the ethnic, cultural, linguistic, and religious
identity of national minorities on their territory" was collectively
protected and promoted."'
A separate section entitled "Human Dimension of the CSCE"'89
established firm measures to exchange and respond to requests for
information," created diplomatic channels for bringing situations un-
der the human dimension to the attention of participating States, 91
and provided for bilateral meetings to examine questions among
participating States on the human dimension of the CSCE. 92 The
States also decided to convene a Conference of the Human Dimension
(CHD) of the CSCE in order to review developments in the human
dimension, evaluate the functioning of its provisions, and consider
practical proposals for new measures to improve and enhance its
effectiveness.93
The first CHD meeting* in Paris ended without a Concluding
Document94 because of the lack of a consensus on a common text.95
" Tretter, supra note 78, at 260, n. 7 and accompanying text.
Id. at 258.
Id. at 259. Only Romania, although a signatory to the declaration, refused to
be bound by the human rights passages. It claimed that they constituted an unac-
ceptable interference in its internal affairs. Id. at 260. Apparently, Romania relied
on the loophole statement providing that CSCE states would "respect each other's
right . . . to determine their laws, regulations, practices, and policies." CSCE Session
Ends with Historic Human Rights Accord, Facts on File World News Digest, Jan.
20, 1989, at 25, col 1.
" See Tretter, supra note 78, at 264.
" The "human dimension of the CSCE" refers to "the undertakings entered into
in the Final Act and in other CSCE documents concerning respect for all human
rights and fundamental freedoms, human contacts and other issues of a related
humanitarian character." Vienna Concluding Document, supra note 3, at 34.
Id. at para. (1).
9, Id. at para. (3).
92 Id. at 34.
91 Id. at 34.
135 CONG. REc. E2417 (daily ed. June 29, 1989) (statement of Sen. Hoyer).
" Soviets Take Swipe at Romania at Rights Meeting, Proprietary to the United
Press International (June 23, 1989, International Section, LEXIS, Nexis library, UPI
file).
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However, the meeting was viewed with positive results as a forum for
discussion of the human dimension mechanism outlined in the Vienna
Concluding Document.96 Still, the significant violations of human rights
provisions of the Vienna Concluding Document emphasized the fact
that the ultimate success of the CHD depends entirely on the extent
to which it will lead to improved compliance with CSCE provisions. 97
Though none of the thirty-five CSCE States is in total compliance with
the Vienna Concluding Document and the other Helsinki accords, the
very nature of the system is one of a continuing process, and there is
always room for improvement among its members.9
III. ANALYsIs
The importance of the Copenhagen Document on Human Rights
rests on the fact that it is the first written declaration of intent of
the Conference on the Human Dimension from the CSCE States.
The Copenhagen Document greatly and explicitly expands the human
rights commitments of its Member States. 99 The significance of this
depends on whether the CDHR is taken as a political statement, or
whether it contains legally binding precepts which may or may not
be enforceable as to these commitments.
As will be shown, the intellectual debate 0 over the legally binding
nature of the Helsinki Accords has been addressed with varying
degrees of success in the judicial context. The Final Act was considered
more of a political than a legal instrument in many cases, based on
135 CONG. REc. E2416 (daily ed. June 29, 1989) (statement of Sen. Hoyer).
Id. at E2417.
91 135 CoNG. REc. E1817 (daily ed. May 23, 1989) (statement of Sen. Hoyer).
" See supra notes 9-39 and accompanying text.
100 Many scholars, particularly those who were involved in the process leading up
to the signing of the Final Act, maintain that the Helsinki Accords can have no
legally binding nature because the drafters of the Act made provisions against its
being regarded as a binding treaty. See, e.g., Russell, The Helsinki Declaration:
Brobdingnag or Lilliput?, 70 AM. J. INT'L L. 242, 246-249 (1976); see also supra
note 65 and accompanying text (explanation of provisions against treaty). Others
contend that the Act is not binding but produces legal effects similar to those of
a treaty. See Kiss & Dominick, supra note 65, at 299-310. One author, in equating
the Final Act with the UDHR and the 1966 International Covenants on Human
Rights, stated that the Accords set forth "binding standards that ought to be
followed." Pechota, East European Perceptions of the Helsinki Final Act and the
Role of Citizen Initiatives, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 467, 468 (1980). For a partial
review of approaches taken towards interpreting the legal nature and aspects of the
Final Act, see Paust, Transnational Freedom of Speech: Legal Aspects of the Helsinki
Final Act, 45 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 55-61 (1982).
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the generality of its provisions, which were viewed as more difficult
to apply than the express terms of black letter law. The specific
nature of the CDHR embracing international human rights covenants
which are accepted as international legal custom, may provide the
basis for conferring a legal aspect to the Copenhagen Document.
Like the Helsinki Final Act, the CDHR may produce legal effects
with similar consequences of those found in a treaty. 10 For instance,
in addition to the monitoring groups that arose spontaneously out
of the original accords,' °2 the CDHR provides for development of
better means to ensure compliance with international human rights, 03
and enumerates some of the available remedies for alleged viola-
tions."°4 The document also enhances the human dimension of the
Vienna Concluding Document by providing a time frame for written
responses to requests for information as to human rights violations',
and for requested bilateral meetings. I°6
Comparison of similar human rights documents and their imple-
mentation may be used to draw conclusions about the possible future
legal effects of the Copenhagen Document. As the CDHR is part of
an on-going process, it must be evaluated with regards to the human
rights provisions of the prior Helsinki documents."l 7 Although the
Copenhagen Document is not a treaty, °8 its predication on legal
norms that restate and emphasize customary norms of international
10, Kiss & Dominick, supra note 65, at 302-303. Examples include the review of
the implementation of the Document's provisions through the request for information
and recourse to international bodies. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
" See supra note 61.
"0' See supra text accompanying notes 24-25.
104 See supra note 26.
10, Participating States promise "to provide in as short a time as possible, but no
later than four weeks, a written response to requests for information and to repre-
sentations made to them in writing by other participating States .... " Copenhagen
Document, supra note 1, at para. (42.1).
106 The Document states "that the bilateral meetings... will take place as soon
as possible, as a rule within three weeks of the date of request." Copenhagen
Document, supra note 1, at para. (42.2).
-o The Final Act binds the participating States to conformity with the Charter of
the United Nations and with the UDHR, and pledges the Member States to fulfill
their obligations to international human rights declarations such as the International
Covenants on Human Rights. Final Act, supra note 2, at (l)(a)(VII). In addition,
the CDHR indicates that its Member States will consider acceding to other inter-
national human rights instruments, such as the ECHR and the International Human
Rights Covenants of 1966. See supra notes 20, 21, 51-53, and accompanying text.
'" Since the Copenhagen Document is a continuation of the Helsinki Accords, it
should bear the same legal and international authority as its parent document, the
Final Act. See supra notes 65, 100.
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law' 9 may give it the legal force of the international custom upon
which it relies." 0 At the very least, the Copenhagen Document may
be considered a "program of action""' which may lead to creation
of customary international law." 2
Decisions of the International Court of Justice affirm that an
obligation to respect fundamental human rights is contained within
the precepts of general international law."' For instance, the ICJ
impliedly held that obligations under international human rights con-
ventions exist independently under general international law, and thus
may apply to non-signatory nations." 4 The Court later held that
obligations "towards the international community as a whole'"'
derive, inter alia, "from the principles and rules concerning the basic
rights of the human person." '" 6
The importance of international documents and their human rights
provisions should not be undermined merely because it may take
109 D'Amato, supra note 68, at 962.
110 Cf. Sohn, supra note 69 and accompanying text (as an international agreement
is adhered to by its signatories over time, it becomes increasingly binding as inter-
national customary law).
- See Kiss & Dominick, supra note 65, at 308-15. A "program of action" is a
non-traditional type of international legal instrument containing a non-binding,
directive text producing limited legal effects. Id. at 314-15.
112 Whether or not the Final Act would lead to creation of international customary
law was an open question in 1980. Id. This question remains unanswered (or
unanswerable?) today. The uncertainty as to whether the most recent developments
at Copenhagen will lead to international customary law is speculative, although the
specificity of the Copenhagen Document as compared to the original Accords does
favor its acceptance as indicative of international customary law in the human rights
field.
"I Rodley, Human Rights and Humanitarian Intervention: The Case Law of the
World Court, 38 INT'L & Comp. L.Q. 321 (1989).
114 Id. at 322. The ICJ reached this conclusion in Reservations to the Convention
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, wherein the Court
observed that "the principles underlying the Convention are principles which are
recognised by civilised nations as binding on States, even without any conventional
obligation." 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23 (May 21). Thus, certain obligations outlined in
international agreements may exist independently under general international law.
Rodley, supra note 113, at 322 (The ICJ has indicated when obligations under the
provisions of an actual international treaty may bind nonsignatories in The North
Sea Continental Shelf Cases (W. Ger. v. Den.; W. Ger. v. Neth.) 1969 I.C.J. 34,
at 28-32, (paras. 37-46) (Feb. 20)).
"15 Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction. Light and Power Company (Belg. v.
Spain), [Second Phase], 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32 (para. 33) (Feb. 5). The ICJ distinguished
between bilateral diplomatic obligations and obligations towards the entire inter-
national community (erga omnes), as "all States can be held to have a legal interest
in [the] protection" of the latter. Id.
116 Id. at 32 (para. 34).
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some time before these provisions are expressly upheld in a judicial
context. The UN Charter had been in existence for nearly twenty
years before the International Court of Justice recognized its human
rights clauses as binding legal obligations."17 The ICJ similarly held
that a State's obligations erga omnes under international customary
law require it to refrain from human rights infractions that are
incompatible with the UDHR as well as the UN Charter."" Neither
the UN Charter nor the UDHR are international treaties, yet their
importance cannot be denied as "basic component[s] of international
customary law, binding on all states, not only on members of the
United Nations."' 1 9
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has also incorporated human
rights into European Community law on the basis of international
customary law common to its Member States. 20 The ECJ indirectly
invoked the European Convention on Human Rights in Nold v.
Commission of the European Communities,'2' when it held that
"[Flundamental rights form an integral part of the general principles
of law .... In safeguarding these rights, the Court is bound to
draw inspiration from constitutional traditions common to the Mem-
ber States, and it cannot therefore uphold measures which are in-
compatible with fundamental rights recognized and protected by the
Constitutions of those States. Similarly, international treaties for the
protection of human rights on which the Member States have col-
,,7 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South-West Africa) Notwithstanding the Security Council Resolution 276
(1970) 1971 I.C.J. 6 (Jan. 26). The Court stated that "distinctions, restrictions, and
limitations exclusively based on grounds of race, colour, descent or national or
ethnic origin which constitute a denial of fundamental human rights [are] a flagrant
violation of the purposes and principles of the [UN] Charter." Id. at para. 131.
1,8 Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S.
v. Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3 (May 24). "Wrongfully to deprive human beings of their
freedom . . . is in itself manifestly incompatible with principles of the Charter of
the United Nations, as well as with the fundamental principles enunciated in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights." Id. at 42 (para. 91). For a more detailed
discussion of the implementation of international human rights law by the ICJ, see
Rodley, supra note 113.
,,9 Sohn, supra note 41, at 16-17.
,20 Amer, Survey of the European Convention on Human Rights and Its Impact
on National and Int'l Institutions, 12 ILSA J. INT'L L. 1, 12 (1988).
121 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 491 (Case 4/73). The Nold case involved interference
with the right to free trade among EC states. The human rights provisions of the
ECHR were impliedly touched upon when the Court, in the context of trade rights,
elaborated on the role of fundamental rights within the EC. See Amer, supra note
120, at 12-13 for a more complete analysis.
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laborated or of which they are signatories, can supply guidelines
which should be followed within the framework of Community law.'""
The ECJ later directly referred to specific provisions of the ECHR
in Rutili v Minister for the Interior23 , wherein it expanded application
of fundamental rights beyond European Community institutions to
the actions of its Member States. 14
Decisions of international courts have given weight to guidelines
of international conferences, 25 as well as to international treaties and
conventions. Citations to the Helsinki Accords in international legal
adjudications may with time increase the legal significance of the
Accords. 26 The specific nature of the human rights provisions in the
Copenhagen Document, and the fact that these provisions support
and rely on existing human rights conventions commonly cited by
international courts, help foster the legal aspects of the CDHR. The
recognition in the Copenhagen Document of the "important expertise
of the Council of Europe in the field of human rights and fundamental
freedoms"1 27 and the commitment of the participating States to con-
sider means for the Council to make a contribution to the human
dimension of the CSCE serve to further enhance and expand the
legal aspects of the Copenhagen Document and may lead to secure
methods of implementation through an established human rights in-
strument.
CSCE Member States have given legal effect to the Helsinki Accords
by establishing internal legislation in compliance with the Accords.'2
12 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 507.
'u 1975 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1219, 1232, para. 32. Rutili dealt with restrictions
on the free movement of workers.
114 "Rutili is important not only because the Court made direct reference to the
ECHR, but also because it extended the application of fundamental rights to the
action of Member States, not only to EC institutions." Amer, supra note 120, at
14.
125 Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as a Canon of Domestic Statutory
Construction, 43 VAND. L. Rv. 1103, 1179 and n. 322 (1990). One example cited
by. Steinhardt is Texaco Overseas Petroleum Co. v. Libyan Arab Republic, 53 I.L.R.
389, 483-95 (Arb. 1977), reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1, 27-31 (1978). Steinhardt, supra
at n. 322.
' D'Amato, supra note 68, at 963.
27 Copenhagen Document, supra note 1, at para. 28.
328 For instance, 22 U.S.C. §§ 3001-3009 (1982 & Supp. 1988) establishes the
Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, whose purpose is to "monitor
the acts of the [CSCE] signatories which reflect compliance with or violation of the
Articles of the Final Act." 22 U.S.C. § 3002. The McGovern Ammendment, 22
U.S.C. § 2691 (1982), was also adopted in accordance with the Helsinki Accords
to promote freedom of movement across international borders. See Allende v. Schultz,
845 F.2d 1111, 1113 n.3 (lst Cir. 1988).
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Unlike human rights conventions of the UN and European Com-
munity, which are adjudicated by the International Court of Justice
and the European Court of Justice, respectively, there are no specific
organs for enforcement or adjudication within the CSCE framework.
The Accords seem to create obligations which CSCE Member States
must reach on their own. 29
Application of the Accords in United States federal courts, although
largely unsuccessful on an individual basis, has led to the courts'
acceptance of the CSCE as indicative of the status of international
law and international general customs regarding human rights. The
Seventh Circuit rejected an argument that the Soviet Union waived
its sovereign immunity to a suit for damages in United States courts
by signing the Helsinki Accords in Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics.130 The plaintiff in Frolova argued that the Soviet Union
was subject to an action for loss of consortium in delaying her
husband's emigration to the United States for one year. The court
responded that the Accords were established in a manner requiring
implementation of the provisions at issue by the participating States, 13
and thus were not self-executing and were not anticipated to provide
a basis for a private lawsuit in American courts. 3 2 The court implied,
however, that such international agreements could provide evidence
of customary international law in connection with a jurisdictional
argument, which the plaintiff did not advance. 33 The court interpreted
the Accords as not creating judicially enforceable rights in domestic
courts because of the need for caution against judicial involvement
in foreign relations, and because the sections of the Accords at issue
were phrased in generalities. 34 This partial reliance on the generalities
of the Final Act human rights provisions leaves open the question
of whether more specific provisions in later modifications of the
Accords, as found in the Copenhagen Document, may provide the
basis for enforcement in domestic courts when jurisdiction is appro-
priate to the subject matter of the suit. Recently, a United States
'- Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 375 (7th Cir.
1985). See also U.S. DEP'T ST. SPECAL REPORT No. 182, at 2 (1989) (Soviet
implementation of CSCE unsatisfactory because of failure to draft new laws in line
with international human rights standards).
761 F.2d 370, 378 (7th Cir. 1985).
Id. at 376.
132 Id. at 375.
- Id. at 374 n.6.
" Id. at 375.
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District Court indicated that the Helsinki Accords are indicative of
international human rights law. The defendant, an American Indian,
in United States v. Kakwirakeron,33 moved for reconsideration of
his motion to dismiss his indictment on conspiracy and weapons
charges, basing his motion on the Helsinki Final Act as a represen-
tative source of international law on the right to self-determination
of peoples.'3 6 The motion was denied on other grounds, as well as
because the generality of the Helsinki provisions create obligations
on the signatory countries to independently reach established goals,
and thus does not create judicially enforceable rights for private
individuals in United States courts. 37 However, the court noted that
international law, in the absence of a treaty, could be ascertained
"by the general usage and practice of nations; or by judicial decisions
recognizing and enforcing that law."' 38 The court then stated that
"[t]he Helsinki Accords, the objectives of which have received con-
tinued support from the signatory states, would certainly be indicative
of the status of international law on self-determination of peoples
and of the duty of nations to abide by their international obliga-
tions."' 3 9 This statement implies that the Copenhagen Document, in
reflecting the continued support of its signatory States, and in sig-
nificantly expanding the specific nature of its terms and obligations,
represents an important step towards establishing a recognizable legal
aspect of the Helsinki process regarding human rights.
The problem lies in the fact that "[i]nternational institutions such
as... the Helsinki Commission rest on legal foundations that are
neither strictly conventional nor strictly customary.'' Thus, inter-
pretation of the legal aspects of the CSCE is a source of disagreement
among legal scholars'4 because of the uncertainty as to what type
of legal document the Accords and subsequent supportive conferences
have produced. Whether the Accords are a non-binding "program
of action" which produce legal effects, such as monitoring groups
to ensure compliance with the objectives of the Accords, 4 2 or whether
" 730 F. Supp. 1200 (N.D.N.Y. 1990).
" Id. at 1200-01.
,"7 Id. at 1202.
I" Id., citing Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980) (quoting
United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-161 (1820)).
I" Id. at 1202.
"4 Steinhardt, supra note 125, at 1180.
"4 See generally D'Amato, supra note 68 (review of four interpretive approaches);
see also sources cited supra note 100.
" See supra notes 65-67 & III and accompanying text.
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the Accords are merely political statements of the signatory States'
position on human rights which indicate the international legal custom
on human rights law may, in the long run, prove to be an academic
argument.
The only enforcement of the CSCE prior to the Copenhagen Meet-
ing was the "mobilization of shame' 143 which functioned through
the use of international publicity as a sanction against failure to
comply with agreed upon provisions. The separation of the "human
dimension" into an instrument distinct from the military aspects of
the Accords'" served to enhance the importance placed on human
rights by CSCE Member States. The establishment of the "peer
review" process in the Vienna Concluding Document represents the
unlocking of a door to implementation, and perhaps to indirect
enforcement of the human rights provisions in the Helsinki process.
That door has been opened by the Copenhagen Document, in that
specific measures and controls on the review process have created
more of a legal framework upon which the pursuit of the human
rights goals of the Final Act and its offspring may be enforced. By
expanding the specific provisions of various types or subsets of human
rights (such as national minority rights), and by listing effective
remedies (such as the right to refer human rights abuses to competent
international bodies)' 45 and reaffirming the on-going process of im-
proving the advancement of human rights, the Copenhagen Document
serves to further entrench the human dimension of the CSCE within
the international commitments of its Member States.
By providing a forum for international discussion of human rights,
the Helsinki process may have helped to set in motion the recent
developments in the democratization of Eastern. Europe. Clearly,
advances in the human dimension have had to wait for reform among
Member States which earlier had been in gross violation of the human
"4 Opsahl, Instruments of Implementation of Human Rights, 10 HUM. RTS. L.J.
13, 27 (1989). Since unanimous approval of all participating States is required for
documentation of each step in the Helsinki process, publicity is a powerful weapon
towards enforcement. After all, a state should not sign a document outlining human
rights principles which it does not intend to follow. This problem is perhaps why
Romania went as far as issuing an official written declaration that it would not
abide by the human rights provisions in the Vienna Concluding Document after it
had become a signatory of that document. See supra note 87 and accompanying
text.
- An example is security in Europe through arms reduction talks. For a general
background, see Russell, supra note 100, at 244-61.
"' See supra note 26.
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rights provisions. Romanian and Bulgarian intransigence towards hu-
man rights, and numerous violations among other Member States,
led to failure to produce a document at the first Conference on the
Human Dimension in Paris in 1989.'4 Thus, the Copenhagen Doc-
ument serves as the first set of guidelines for inplementation of the
goals of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE at
a time of rapid political change in Eastern Europe that may prove
crucial to the development of human rights standards.
The most sweeping reforms and advances of the Copenhagen Doc-
ument are more political than legal, such as the recognition and
approval by Soviet bloc nations of the recent fundamental political
changes that have occurred in Europe since the 1989 meeting in
Paris. 47 The legal aspects and significance of the Document cannot
be adequately evaluated so soon after its creation, because its impact
must be examined as it is applied by the CSCE States over time.
III. CONCLUSION
Although the Copenhagen Document is not a treaty, and therefore
currently has no more binding force than the Helsinki Accords them-
selves, the document is a strong step forward in the promotion of
human rights and the development of a peaceful and stable transition
to a unified Europe equally respectful of human rights and funda-
mental freedoms everywhere. Its expansion of specific provisions
regarding numerous international human rights issues, when compared
to previous general developments in the Helsinki process, may help
provide a framework for developing legally binding implementation
of the human dimension of the CSCE. However, it is probable that
the Copenhagen Document will continue to develop as a political
process rather than evolve into a legal process, although it may with
time come to firmly embrace established legal instruments for the
protection and promotion of human rights in Europe.
Victor Y. Johnson
146 Supra note 95.
147 See supra notes 13-22 and accompanying text.
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